Reputation based selfishness prevention techniques for mobile ad-hoc networks by Rodríguez Mayol, F. A. & Gozalvez, J.
Telecommun Syst (2014) 57:181–195
DOI 10.1007/s11235-013-9786-y
Reputation based selfishness prevention techniques for mobile
ad-hoc networks
Alberto Rodriguez-Mayol · Javier Gozalvez
Published online: 17 August 2013
© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013
Abstract Mobile ad-hoc networks require nodes to cooper-
ate in the relaying of data from source to destination. How-
ever, due to their limited resources, selfish nodes may be un-
willing to forward packets, which can deteriorate the multi-
hop connectivity. Different reputation-based protocols have
been proposed to cope with selfishness in mobile ad-hoc net-
works. These protocols utilize the watchdog detection mech-
anism to observe the correct relaying of packets, and to com-
pile information about potential selfish nodes. This informa-
tion is used to prevent the participation of selfish nodes in
the establishment of multi-hop routes. Despite its wide use,
watchdog tends to overestimate the selfish behavior of nodes
due to the effects of radio transmission errors or packet col-
lisions that can be mistaken for intentional packet drops. As
a result, the availability of valid multi-hop routes is reduced,
and the overall performance deteriorates. This paper pro-
poses and evaluates three detection techniques that improve
the ability of selfishness prevention protocols to detect self-
ish nodes and to increase the number of valid routes.
Keywords MANET · Mobile ad-hoc networks ·
Selfishness · Reputation techniques · Watchdog
1 Introduction
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) MANET (Mo-
bile Ad hoc NETwork) working group describes MANETs
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as autonomous networks comprised of free roaming nodes
(wireless communication devices) [3]. These nodes can
communicate with each other either directly (single-hop)
or indirectly (multi-hop) to perform the required tasks. In
addition, nodes may be powered by an exhaustible en-
ergy source, and the link between them may be bandwidth-
constrained. Ad hoc networks require no centralized admin-
istration or fixed network infrastructure such as base stations
or access points, and can be quickly and inexpensively set
up as needed. When data transfer is required between any
pair of non-adjacent nodes, the network relies on the nodes
between them to forward data packets. However, because
mobile nodes are typically constrained by power and com-
puting resources, a selfish node may not be willing to use its
resources to always forward packets that are not of its inter-
est, even though it would expect others to forward its pack-
ets [9]. In this context, encouraging the nodes’ cooperation
in the packet relaying process is of primary importance [17].
The problem of selfish nodes has been widely studied
in the MANET community [21], where Selfishness Preven-
tion Protocols (SPP) have been proposed to encourage nodes
to cooperate in network functions, and prevent intentional
attacks from malicious nodes [14]. Different categories of
SPP have been proposed to cope with the packet dropping
caused by selfish nodes refusing to relay other nodes’ pack-
ets: reputation-based [1], credit-based and those based on
game theory [21]. Credit-based schemes use a virtual or
real currency to pay for self originated data retransmitted
by other nodes. Credit is also used to compensate for the
utilization of resources in the relaying process. Nodes can
also gain credit by retransmitting other nodes’ packets or by
exchanging real money. The lack of scalability, centraliza-
tion, and the need for a tamper-proof hardware are some of
the potential limitations of the credit based schemes [21].
Game theory models simulate a game where each mobile
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node can choose either to retransmit other nodes’ data or
not. Equilibrium stability of different strategies can be stud-
ied analytically [18]. However, game theory models usu-
ally fail to reproduce important parameters of real systems.
Game theoretic studies usually assume unrealistic scenario
conditions, and underestimate the importance of the wireless
channel unreliability in the detection accuracy of misbehav-
ing nodes, with few exceptions [22]. In addition, [22] high-
lights that the repeated game model, which is widely used in
the literature to model the nodes’ cooperation strategies, is
not directly applicable to mobile ad-hoc networks.
This study focuses on reputation-based SPP techniques in
which nodes register the observed behavior of other nodes
(i.e. whether they relay packets or not) generally using
the watchdog detection technique proposed in [12]. Other
techniques have been proposed to replace the watchdog
and monitor the correct relaying of packets by neighbor-
ing nodes. The TWOACK scheme proposed in [10] is an
alternative detection technique that makes use of extra ac-
knowledgement packets to avoid the potential watchdog’s
detection inaccuracy. However, it results in additional sys-
tem overhead. Other detection methods like [8] consider sta-
tistical data of the reception of frames at the data link layer
to derive the identity of potential misbehaving nodes. Nev-
ertheless, the accuracy of probability-based detection meth-
ods depends on the compilation of a large set of obser-
vations, which may not be rapidly available. Watchdog is
the most referenced detection method, and was first intro-
duced in [12], and utilized in [13] and [2]. When implement-
ing watchdog, each node launches a “watchdog” to monitor
its neighbors’ packet forwarding activities. Following [12],
Core was proposed to enforce cooperation among selfish
nodes [13], using watchdog to identify and isolate misbe-
having nodes. More recently, TEAM introduced the con-
cept of indirect observation, which is a generalization of the
watchdog detection method [2], and also proposed the use of
recommendations to complement the information provided
by the watchdog detection technique. All these concepts will
be fully discussed in Sect. 3, where the TEAM protocol is
also explained.
Reputation-based SPP protocols using the watchdog de-
tection technique are fully distributed, and generally exhibit
good performance and an efficient use of the wireless com-
munications channel [4]. However, previous studies showed
that the evaluation of these protocols under simplistic op-
erating conditions can provide inaccurate indications about
their operation and performance [16]. In particular, the au-
thors demonstrated the important impact of the radio prop-
agation conditions and packet collisions on the expected
performance of reputation based SPP techniques. Based on
these observations, this work proposes three novel strategies
to improve the operation and performance of reputation-
based cooperation schemes in MANETs, and evaluates their
operation under realistic conditions.
Fig. 1 Operation of the watchdog detection technique
2 Watchdog detection technique
SPP protocols are aimed at detecting and isolating selfish
nodes in order to encourage them to cooperate in multi-
hop communications. Reputation-based protocols are usu-
ally made up of two modules: detection and reaction. Each
node uses its detection module to observe whether neigh-
bor nodes retransmit or not packets from other nodes. The
reaction module is in charge of updating a reputation table
in which each neighbor node is assigned a rating level fol-
lowing the observations made by the detection module. This
information can then be used by routing protocols to select
a multi-hop route free from selfish nodes. In addition, self-
ish nodes could be isolated from the participation and es-
tablishment of multi-hop communications. The majority of
reputation-based SPP protocols employ the watchdog detec-
tion technique [12]. This technique is based on the passive
acknowledgment of the relaying of packets by other nodes,
by overhearing the relay node’s transmissions, as illustrated
in the example of Fig. 1. From here onwards, the scenario
depicted in Fig. 1 will be used to explain the operation of
the SPP protocols.
In the example shown in Fig. 1, the source node (S) es-
tablishes a multi-hop route to transmit its data packets to
the destination node (D). In particular, the packets from
the source node are transmitted following the multi-hop se-
quence S, A, B , C and D. In Fig. 1, a packet originated in
the source node is being transmitted from node A, which
has the role of a precursor node in the current transmis-
sion, to node B , which has the role of a relay node (step 1).
A packet buffer in the precursor node keeps a temporary
copy of the transmitted packets that have to be forwarded
by the relay node. Each packet buffered is assigned a time-
out within which the packet has to be forwarded to the suc-
cessor node, in this case node C, by the relay node. If the
relay node transmits the packet within the timeout (step 2),
this transmission is overheard by the precursor node, and
the relay node is noted to have cooperated correctly. This
will be referred to as ‘packet forwarding detection’. The pre-
cursor node looks for the copy of the packet relayed that
was stored in its buffer, and removes it from the buffer. If
the relayed packet is not overheard correctly by the precur-
sor node within the timeout, then the relay node is assumed
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Fig. 2 Cumulative distribution function of the forwarding detection
time
to have acted selfishly, i.e. it has dropped the packet. Sim-
ilarly, this is referred to as a ‘packet dropping detection’.
Such dropping is reported to the reaction module, which can
then downgrade the reputation rating of the relay node in
the reputation table of the precursor node. Depending on the
implemented SPP technique, two types of reputation can be
distinguished: direct and indirect. Direct reputation corre-
sponds to the case that has been previously explained, where
it is the precursor node which observes the behavior of the
relay node. Alternatively, in Fig. 1, a neighbor node E could
indirectly observe the relaying of the packet from the pre-
cursor node to the relay node, and then from the relay node
to the successor node.
The Packet Timeout is the time within which the relay
node must forward a packet it has received from another
node. In this context, the forwarding detection time refers
to the interval between the instant at which the copy of
the packet that has to be forwarded is stored at the buffer
of the precursor node, and the instant when it is correctly
overheard and removed from the buffer. The forwarding de-
tection time includes the sum of all delays introduced dur-
ing the transmission of the packet from the precursor to the
relay node. Packets are correctly overheard only when the
Packet Timeout is larger than the forwarding detection time.
A too large value of the Packet Timeout increases the time
necessary to detect nodes acting selfishly, while a too short
one may prevent the relay nodes to retransmit the packets
in time, increasing the inaccuracy of the selfishness detec-
tion process. Simulations were conducted to find an ade-
quate balance for the Packet Timeout parameter. The con-
ducted simulations used the platform described in Sect. 5
and considered that all nodes cooperated in the relaying of
the packets. Figure 2 represents the obtained CDF (Cumula-
tive Distribution Function) of the forwarding detection time.
In order to ensure that all relayed packets can be correctly
overheard, the Packet Timeout has been selected to be larger
than the 99th percentile of the forwarding detection time (i.e.
41.5 ms). In particular, the Packet Timeout has been set to
50 ms in this work.
The watchdog technique is used by the majority of
reputation-based SPP protocols reported in the literature.
However, radio propagation errors and packet collisions due
to channel congestion can notably deteriorate the perfor-
mance and the selfishness detection capability of the watch-
dog technique [16]. In the example illustrated in Fig. 1,
packet collisions could prevent the precursor node to cor-
rectly observe the forwarding of the packet by the relay
node. Reference [5] claims that packet collisions do not
affect the watchdog’s detection capability, even with high
traffic load. However, the conclusion was extracted using a
four laptop test-bed, which might be a too limited testing
environment. Repeated incorrect dropping detections affect-
ing one relay node lead to its incorrect accusation as self-
ish node, which would then prevent its participation in fur-
ther multi-hop communications. As a result, the availability
of routes without known selfish nodes, referred to as safe
routes, can be severely reduced. This paper presents three
techniques aimed at improving the capacity to detect and
isolate selfish nodes of SPP protocols using the watchdog
mechanism. The proposed techniques have also been de-
signed to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the de-
tection inaccuracy of the original watchdog detection mech-
anism in the presence of packet collisions and radio trans-
mission errors. The proposed techniques can be adapted to
be executed in parallel to any existing reputation-based SPP
protocol. To demonstrate their flexibility, the performance
of the proposed techniques will be analyzed considering two
different SPP protocols: Marti’s protocol proposed in [12],
and the TEAM protocol presented in [2].
3 Reputation-based selfishness prevention protocols
3.1 Marti’s selfishness prevention protocol
The first SPP implemented in this work was proposed
in [12], and it is referred to in the rest of the paper as Marti’s
protocol. In Marti’s protocol, each precursor node uses the
watchdog detection technique to observe the behavior of the
relay nodes. A reputation table is maintained in each precur-
sor node to register the reputation and the number of faults
of every other known node, following the information col-
lected by the watchdog technique. A heuristic algorithm,
which is explained below,1 is then executed to select the
route most likely to be reliable, i.e. without selfish nodes.
Each node counts the number of times that a relay node
has refused to retransmit its packets. When the number of
1Unless otherwise stated, the numerical values of the implementation
parameters are chosen following the indications in the original imple-
mentation of Marti’s protocol [12] (see Table 1).
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Table 1 Marti’s protocol main configuration parameters
Parameter Value
Default Rating 0.5
Isolation Time (s) 500
Maximum Faults Threshold 5
Non-Accused Node Rating 0.0–1.0
faults is greater than a certain threshold, which is referred
to as Maximum Faults Threshold, the relay node is accused
of acting selfishly. The accusation lasts for a period referred
to as Isolation Time, after which the node’s reputation is re-
stored. The Isolation Time parameter was not specified in
the original Marti’s implementation [12]. In this work, the
Isolation Time has been set to 500 s, a value larger than the
average duration of a user traffic session (151 s for the traf-
fic model implemented in this work). The defined Isolation
Time ensures that the technique is tested sufficiently during
the simulation time. In addition, each node is assigned a
reputation rating, which starts at the Default Rating and is
updated following the observations made by the detection
module (additional details can be found in [12]). The rating
of a non-accused node is in the range [0.0–1.0]. If one node
is accused of acting selfishly, its rating is set automatically
to a highly negative value (Selfish Node Rating).
The exact value of the Maximum Faults Threshold was
not specified in Marti’s original paper [12]. A trade-off be-
tween the speed and accuracy of the detection of selfish
nodes must be considered to set its optimal value. A too
large value will increment the number of packets that nodes
acting selfishly drop before being accused. A too small value
will increase the number of times that cooperative nodes
are accused incorrectly, for example due to packet colli-
sions or radio transmission errors. In this context, prelimi-
nary simulations for different values of the Maximum Faults
Threshold parameter have been conducted to select its opti-
mal value using the platform and simulation conditions re-
ported in Sect. 5. The maximum PDR (Packet Delivery Ra-
tio) achieved for non-selfish nodes is reached for a threshold
equal to 5, which also guarantees the lowest PDR for selfish
nodes. This is a desirable effect in order to encourage self-
ish nodes to participate in the relaying of packets from other
users. PDR refers to the ratio of packets correctly received
divided by the number of transmitted packets.
Marti’s protocol also introduces accusation messages that
let the precursor node warn the source node about the pres-
ence of a selfish node in the route. To establish a multi-hop
link, the routing protocol tries to select a route without self-
ish nodes. To this aim, Marti’s protocol calculates the Trust
Level Path metric for each multi-hop route by averaging the
rating of all the nodes participating in the multi-hop route
under evaluation. Selfish nodes have a very negative reputa-
tion value, and therefore, the Trust Level Path metric for a
route request with selfish nodes is negative and the request
is automatically rejected. The selection of the route with the
higher average reduces the probability of the participation
of selfish nodes. Packet forwarding requests coming from
identified selfish nodes are not accepted by Marti’s protocol.
3.2 TEAM selfishness prevention protocol
The second SPP technique implemented in this work is the
TEAM (Trust Enhanced security Architecture for Mobile
ad-hoc networks) protocol [2]. TEAM is composed of a de-
tection module and a reaction module. The detection module
uses three types of entry information to make a decision on
whether a node is acting selfishly: direct reputation, indirect
reputation (using the watchdog detection technique), and
recommended reputation. The trust of a node is the weighted
sum of the three reputation levels, as shown in (1):
T iN(ta+1) =
∑
U type ·  typeN−i (ta), (1)
where
∑
U type = 1, type ∈ {direct, indirect, recommended},
T iN(ta+1) is the new trust level of the node i in the opinion
of the node N ,  typeN−i (ta) is the previous reputation level of
type type of the node i in the opinion of the node N , and
U type is the weight of each reputation type. Non-uniform
weights are assigned to each type of reputation since the
estimation of direct reputation is more reliable. The direct,
observed, and recommended reputations for all other nodes
are initialized to a default value, the threshold-limit Δ. The
direct and indirect reputations levels are incremented or
decremented when forwarded or dropped packets are de-
tected. Also, when a node receives a packet that has to be
forwarded, the recommended reputation of the nodes that
have previously forwarded the packet are updated following
the assumption that if a node forwards a packet from an-
other node it implicitly recommends it (details can be found
in [2]). If the trust level of a relay node is smaller than the
threshold-limit Δ, the relay node is accused of acting self-
ishly for a period of time called the Isolation Time.
The reaction module of the TEAM protocol is required to
perform the following trust computations: trust for a node,
trust for a packet and trust for a route. The calculation of
the trust for a node has been explained before. When an in-
termediate node receives a packet that has to be forwarded,
it agrees to relay the packet only if the trust for the packet
is at least equal to the threshold-limit Δ. In addition, when
a node receives a Route Request (RREQ) or a Route Re-
ply (RREP) message sent to discover and establish a new
multi-hop route, the reaction module accepts the petition
only if the trust for the route is greater than the threshold-
limit Δ. The trust for a route corresponds to the average
of the trust values assigned to every node in the route. Un-
less otherwise stated, the TEAM implementation parame-
ters have been configured following the original TEAM pro-
posal; these parameters are summarized in Table 2.
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Table 2 TEAM configuration parameters
Parameter Value
Direct Reputation Weight 0.75
Indirect Reputation Weight 0.15
Recommended Reputation Weight 0.15
Threshold-limit Δ 0.5
Reputation Range −1.0–1.0
Isolation Time (s) 500
4 Reputation-based SPP detection proposals
As it has been previously mentioned, radio transmission er-
rors and packet collisions can reduce the capability of the
watchdog technique to accurately detect selfish nodes, and
increase the number of occasions in which safe nodes are
accused of acting selfishly. The detection accuracy of the
observation technique is a crucial aspect for the correct op-
eration of reputation-based SPP protocols. Incorrect accusa-
tions have several negative effects. Cooperating nodes that
are incorrectly accused of acting selfishly are isolated un-
reasonably. Isolation of cooperating nodes will prevent them
from reaching a destination node through multi-hop com-
munications. Additionally, since incorrectly accused nodes
will be avoided in multi-hop routes, the number of potential
safe multi-hop routes is wrongly reduced. This will result in
that some safe multi-hop routes will be underutilized, while
other cooperating nodes will be overloaded by packet for-
warding requests. In this context, this section presents three
techniques proposed to enhance under realistic conditions
the performance of SPP protocols using the watchdog tech-
nique as observation method. The proposed techniques are
designed to prevent the undesirable effects of radio transmis-
sion errors and packet collisions in the accusation decisions.
4.1 RAM—reset activity mode
The first proposal, named Reset Activity Mode (RAM), aims
to reduce the number of incorrect selfish accusations due to
the highly variant radio channel or packet collisions. It is
intended to be executed as an add-on in conjunction with
any reputation-based SPP protocol, like the implemented
Marti’s and TEAM protocols. In the original implementa-
tion of these protocols, nodes accumulate good or bad repu-
tation depending on their behavior observed by other nodes.
If a node is repeatedly detected dropping packets, it will be
accused of acting selfishly and will be isolated. However,
this operation can result in inaccurate selfish accusations if
a node is not capable to overhear the correct relaying of a
packet by another node. This can be due to packet collisions
caused by channel congestion, and to radio transmission er-
rors that are mistaken for intentional packet droppings. To
RAM technique
Packet forwarding detection event
Is relay node categorized as cooperative? →
YES: Is relay node’s reputation smaller than default? →
YES: Restore relay node’s reputation
Reset number of faults of relay node
Packets pending to be relayed are not considered
Fig. 3 Pseudocode of the RAM technique
avoid these inaccurate accusations, RAM is proposed to in-
crease the contribution of forwarding detection in the repu-
tation of a node. The RAM technique reduces the number of
incorrect selfish accusations by defining some actions to be
taken by the precursor node after a packet forwarding detec-
tion. More specifically, when the watchdog module detects
the forwarding of a packet by a relaying node, the reputation
of the relay node in the precursor node’s reputation table is
reset to the default value assigned to an ‘unknown’ node if
it was previously downgraded. The term ‘unknown’ node
refers to a node that becomes visible to another one for the
first time. Additionally, if the considered SPP protocol es-
tablishes that the precursor node has to count the number
of faults that the relay node accumulates, this count is reset
to 0. Finally, the packets that remain in the buffer are re-
moved, and no dropping fault is computed. It is important to
note that the RAM mode is not applied to nodes that have
been accused of behaving selfishly, but only to nodes still
categorized as cooperative. Selfish nodes will not be able to
recover their reputation until the expiration of the Isolation
Time. The pseudocode of the RAM proposal is presented in
Fig. 3.
4.2 WM—warning mode
The Warning Mode (WM) proposal is also designed to pre-
vent incorrect selfish accusations caused by radio trans-
mission errors and packet collisions, but with a different
methodology compared to RAM. In the original implemen-
tation of the reputation-based SPP protocols considered in
this work, when the relay node exhibits bad behavior dur-
ing a certain period of time, it is directly marked as self-
ish, and all the links in which the node is involved are bro-
ken. On the other hand, WM introduces an intermediate cat-
egory, the ‘suspicious’ category, between a ‘neutral’ node
and a node marked as ‘selfish’. The ‘suspicious’ category
operates as a warning for the nodes that are suspected of
behaving selfishly. Before they are definitively marked as
selfish, they have another chance to recover from bad repu-
tation. When the conditions to make a selfish accusation are
matched, the relay node is first marked as ‘suspicious’, and
its links are broken temporally. These conditions can vary
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depending on the considered SPP protocol. In Marti’s proto-
col, a relay node is accused of acting selfishly when the num-
ber of faults exceeds the Maximum Faults Threshold. On the
other hand, in the TEAM protocol, a relay node is accused
of acting selfishly when its reputation becomes smaller than
the Threshold Limit. The ‘suspicious’ nodes can participate
in routing tasks again, but some additional restrictions are
applied in order to prevent an increase in packet dropping
due to a real selfish behavior. In particular, nodes will deal
with ‘suspicious’ nodes as if they were neutral nodes, but
the mechanisms that control the observation and the accu-
sation of the nodes are readjusted to reduce the number of
additional data packets dropped by potential selfish nodes.
First, the timeout a relay node has to forward a packet is
reduced by a factor α. This work sets the Packet Timeout
for suspicious nodes to 25 ms (α = 0.5) following the ex-
isting trade-off between the reduction in the time needed to
eventually accuse a suspicious node, and the increment in
the number of undetected forwarded packets. Preliminary
simulations showed that a Packet timeout of 25 ms for sus-
picious nodes only resulted in 2 % of undetected forwarded
packets. The WM reduction of the Packet Timeout targets
to reduce the time needed to confirm that a suspicious node
is really a selfish one. In this context, a single additional
dropping detection is enough to accuse a suspicious node of
acting selfishly. To this end, the accusation mechanism of
the specific SPP protocol must be modified. When a packet
dropping detection is reported, if the relay node has been
previously marked as ‘suspicious’, it will be then accused of
acting selfishly following the specific procedure established
in the considered SPP protocol. If the relay node is not a
‘suspicious’ node, then no special modification of the orig-
inal implementation of the SPP protocol is needed. On the
other hand, if a precursor node detects that a ‘suspicious’
node is cooperating again, then its reputation will be reset to
the level assigned by default to ‘unknown’ nodes in order to
give the ‘suspicious’ node the chance to recover from pre-
vious bad reputation, which could have been provoked by
packet collisions or radio transmission errors. The specific
actions that must be taken to reset the reputation of a ‘sus-
picious’ node depend on the considered SPP protocol. For
Marti’s protocol, the faults count and the reputation level
are reset. In the case of the TEAM protocol, direct and in-
direct reputations are considered separately, and restored to
the Threshold Limit value established for ‘unknown’ nodes.
The improvement expected with WM comes from the
fact that spurious radio transmission errors, fading and
packet collisions provoke a damaging increment of incor-
rect selfishness accusations in the original implementation
of the watchdog detection technique. On the contrary, using
the WM mode, ‘suspicious’ nodes have an extra chance to
recover from incorrectly assigned bad reputation. If such bad
reputation was provoked by packet collisions or radio trans-
mission errors, the participation of the ‘suspicious’ node
WM technique
Packet dropping detection event
Is it a suspicious node? →
YES: Initiate node’s definitive accusation
NO: Conditions for accusation are matched? →
YES: Mark node as suspicious
Break link and search another route
Adjust Packet timeout
NO: Follow protocol’s indications
Packet forwarding detection event
Is it a suspicious node? →
YES: Restore node’s reputation
Reset number of faults
NO: Follow protocol’s indications
Fig. 4 Pseudocode of the WM technique
can be re-established when communications conditions im-
prove. Alternatively, if the ‘suspicious’ node is truly acting
selfishly, then only few extra packet droppings will be al-
lowed since its selfish behavior will be quickly detected and
the node isolated due to the strict conditions established in
WM for ‘suspicious’ nodes. It is also possible that a node
and the precursor node that marked it as ‘suspicious’ never
interact again due to the mobility of the nodes. In this case,
no selfish accusation is made, but this is not harmful to the
precursor node since it will not use the ‘suspicious’ node
to relay its packets. The pseudocode of the WM proposal is
presented in Fig. 4.
4.3 RFM—reset failure mode
The Reset Failure Mode (RFM) aims to counteract false ac-
cusations provoked by link failures in the link between the
precursor and the relay node, or the relay and the successor
nodes, which can be caused by channel effects like fading
or by the mobility of nodes. The MAC layer is responsible
for detecting link failures and triggering a link failure event
to inform the routing protocol. The routing protocol trans-
mits a “Route Error” message to inform the nodes using the
route that the link has failed. However, before the link fail-
ure event is triggered, some of the packets transmitted by the
precursor node to the relay node may not have been relayed.
As a result, the copies of the packets in the packet buffer of
the precursor node will time out, and the rating of the relay
node in the route will be deteriorated unreasonably.
To avoid this watchdog malfunction in the presence of
link failures, the reputation of the relay node in the precur-
sor node’s reputation table is restored by RFM to the default
value assigned to an unknown node. In addition, RFM re-
moves the packets in the buffer of the precursor node that
are pending to be forwarded by the relay node, irrespective
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RFM technique
Link failure detection event
Is relay node’s reputation smaller than default? →
YES: Reset relay node’s number of faults
Packets pending to be relayed are removed
Restore relay node’s reputation
Fig. 5 Pseudocode of the RFM technique
of their expiration time, since the node is not able to retrans-
mit them. The implementation of RFM depends on the tech-
nique considered. When applied to Marti’s protocol, if a link
failure is detected, the rating of the relay node is evaluated.
If it has been downgraded, it is reset to 0.5 and the number
of faults is reset to 0 since these faults are assumed to have
been provoked by the link failure and not by a possible self-
ish behavior of the node. If applied to the TEAM protocol,
the RFM mode only modifies the reputation of the nodes
since the number of faults parameter is not considered. In
this case, the RFM mode increments the direct and indirect
reputation levels proportionally to the number of packets np
that were pending to be forwarded in the buffer of the pre-
cursor node at the moment of the link failure. In particular
the reputation levels are adjusted as follows:
R1 = R0 + k · np (2)
where R1 and R0 represent the reputation levels (direct or
indirect) after and before the adjustment performed by the
RFM mode when a link failure is detected. The k parameter
has been set to 0.1, which is the penalization applied to the
direct or the indirect reputation of a node for dropping pack-
ets in the original implementation of the TEAM protocol. It
has to be noted that the RFM mode exceptions are only used
when the relay node is seen as a neutral node by the pre-
cursor node. If the relay node is accused of acting selfishly
before the link failure event is triggered, then the selfish rat-
ing and the faults of the relay node remain unchanged.
A potential drawback of RFM is that reputation restora-
tion due to link failures might, in few cases, increase the
reputation of real selfish nodes. This could happen if a link
failure is detected, and the next node in the route is a real
selfish node which has not been yet discovered. However, it
is important to note that this might only happen in multi-hop
transmissions with a short lifetime of multi-hop links, which
in fact should be avoided by efficient ad-hoc routing proto-
cols. In addition, links are expected to have a mean lifetime
greater than the time needed to detect the selfish behavior
of a node in a low to medium mobility scenario where co-
operative multi-hop communications are more feasible. The
pseudocode of the RFM proposal is presented in Fig. 5.
5 Evaluation environment
5.1 Ad-hoc routing protocol
To evaluate the capability of the techniques proposed in
this paper to enhance the operation and performance of
reputation-based SPP protocols, multi-hop communications
need to be simulated, and an ad-hoc routing protocol needs
to be implemented to select an optimum multi-hop route fol-
lowing the information provided by the SPP techniques. In
this work, multi-hop communications are established using
the Dynamic MANET On-demand (DYMO) routing proto-
col [6], successor to the AODV protocol. In the DYMO pro-
tocol, source nodes use Route REQuest (RREQ) messages
to discover a new route to a destination. RREQ replicas are
relayed by neighbor nodes until one of them reaches the
destination. A RREP message is then generated and passed
back to the origin to allow for the multi-hop route to be
established. Routing packets include information about the
identity of all the nodes it passed through in the multi-hop
route so that every node receiving a RREQ or RREP mes-
sage can immediately record a route back to the origin or
destination. Intermediate nodes are allowed to process mul-
tiple replicas of a routing packet more than once. This allows
for the establishment of diverse multi-hop routes following
a selected multi-hop cost function.
5.2 Simulation platform
System level simulations emulating the operation of multi-
hop wireless networks have been carried out using the ns-
2 simulation platform and the Rice Monarch Project ex-
tension for mobile and multi-hop networks [15]. The sim-
ulation environment corresponds to a Manhattan layout of
6 × 6 square-shaped buildings totaling a scenario of 1350 ×
1350 m2, where pedestrians move following the Random
Walk Obstacle model [11]. The density of nodes has been set
on average as equal to one node every 80 m along a street.
This density allows for the establishment of multi-hop trans-
missions between random nodes, and therefore to test the
performance of the proposed techniques in mobile ad-hoc
networks. The initial distribution of the nodes is chosen ran-
domly. Traffic sessions emulate web browsing transmissions
based on the model reported in [19], with a fixed number of 5
pages per session and a fixed reading time between pages of
29.5 s. Each page is composed of 25 objects (packets) with
an inter-arrival packet time of 0.0228 s. To consider poten-
tial channel congestion situations, 15 % of nodes on average
have an active traffic session simultaneously. The simulated
ad-hoc radio interface corresponds to the 802.11a standard
operating at the 5.8 GHz frequency band, and transmitting
with a fixed power level of 17 dBm.
The radio propagation effects are considered through the
path loss, shadowing and multipath fading. The path loss
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represents the local average received signal power relative
to the transmit power as a function of the distance between
the transmitter and the receiver. The shadow fading models
the effect of surrounding obstacles on the mean signal at-
tenuation at a given distance. The path loss is modeled fol-
lowing the urban micro-cell channel model proposed in the
WINNER project [20], which differentiates between LOS
(Line Of Sight) and NLOS (Non Line Of Sight) conditions.
The work reported in [20] also indicates that the shadow-
ing standard deviation should be set equal to 3 dB and 4 dB
for LOS and NLOS conditions respectively. To account for
the shadowing correlation properties, the Gudmunson model
has also been implemented for this work. The multipath fad-
ing effect, resulting from the reception of multiple replicas
of the transmitted signal at the receiver, is modeled through
a Ricean distribution under LOS conditions, and a Rayleigh
distribution under NLOS conditions.
The ns-2 simulation platform models the 802.11a MAC
layer based on CSMA/CA (Carrier Sense Multiple Access
with Collision Avoidance) and its DCF (Distributed Coordi-
nation Function) operation mode. The modeled MAC layer
also includes the optional RTS/CTS (Request to Send/Clear
to Send) mechanism. To reduce the complexity of system
level simulations, the effects at the physical layer result-
ing from the probabilistic nature of the radio environment
are modeled by means of Look-Up Tables (LUTs) follow-
ing the results from [7]. These LUTs, extracted from link
level simulations, map the Packet Error Rate (PER) to the
experienced channel quality conditions.
6 Performance evaluation
The proposed techniques have been designed to enhance
the detection accuracy of reputation-based SPP protocols
that use the watchdog detection mechanism. Such enhance-
ment would increase the overall network performance and
connectivity thanks to improving the ability to rapidly and
precisely identify cooperative and selfish nodes; this ability
would in turn augment the number of safe multi-hop routes.
In this context, Marti and TEAM protocols have been se-
lected as benchmark techniques, and their original perfor-
mance is compared against that achieved when they also im-
plement the three proposed mechanisms.
Tables 3 and 4 show the improvement that can be ob-
tained when combining the techniques proposed compared
to the original Marti and TEAM implementations. WRAM
refers to the combined use of WM and RAM. Correct route
establishments refers to the number of times that a multi-hop
route without selfish nodes was established, while incorrect
route establishments refers to the case when the route in-
cludes selfish nodes. Reputation-based SPP protocols dis-
card route forwarding requests if the node that receives the
Table 3 Improvement obtained with the proposed techniques com-
pared to the original Marti’s protocol (%)
RFM WM RAM WRAM
Incorrect accusations −24.45 −91.39 −59.58 −97.01
Correct accusations −3.35 −46.59 −6.57 −51.5
Incorrect route establishments 2.47 45.92 −1.26 38.47
Correct route establishments 14.19 47.49 26.38 39.46
Incorrect route denials −22.35 −76.51 −56.66 −94.27
Correct route denials −5.78 −6.81 −10.36 −17.67
Table 4 Improvement obtained with the proposed techniques com-
pared to the original TEAM protocol (%)
RFM WM RAM WRAM
Incorrect accusations −37.16 −62.96 −76.01 −92.47
Correct accusations −7.82 −10.7 −7.54 −15.51
Incorrect route establishments 5.3 24.8 −2.13 17.92
Correct route establishments 9.48 24.18 20.43 24.5
Incorrect route denials −37.39 −73.48 −79.44 −95.22
Correct route denials −11.62 −24.32 −20.48 −34.67
routing message detects that any of the nodes participating
in the route is a known selfish node. This is referred to as
route denials. Incorrect route denials refer to the case when
no real selfish node actually participated in the denied route,
while correct route denials indicate that a real selfish node
was included in the route. Incorrect route denials are moti-
vated by previous incorrect accusations due to repeated in-
correct dropping detections provoked by radio transmission
errors and packet collisions. The results reported in Tables 3
and 4 correspond to 20 % of selfish nodes. The results ob-
tained for other percentages of selfish nodes follow similar
trends, and are thus omitted for brevity reasons.
All the proposed techniques are capable to significantly
reduce the number of incorrect route denials. Moreover,
there is a high correlation between the decrease in the num-
ber of incorrect accusations, the decrease in the number of
incorrect route denials, and the decrease in the percentage of
lost packets due to the unavailability of safe routes (which
will be discussed next). Incorrect route denials reduce the
availability of safe routes, and therefore they reduce the
multi-hop connectivity and the PDR (Packet Delivery Ratio,
defined as the ratio of packets correctly received to the total
number of transmitted packets). This negative effect of the
original Marti’s and TEAM implementations is mitigated
with the techniques proposed in this work by reducing the
number of incorrect accusations. Although all the proposed
techniques significantly reduce the number of incorrect ac-
cusations, it is important to highlight the strong reduction
achieved with WRAM; in both cases, the reduction in the
number of incorrect accusations is higher than 90 %. This is
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Fig. 6 Percentage of dropped packets without route for (a) Marti’s and (b) TEAM protocols
Fig. 7 Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) as a function of the percentage of selfish nodes for (a) Marti’s and (b) TEAM protocols
due to the individual contributions of each of the techniques
proposed. In the case of RAM, whenever a forwarding de-
tection occurs, the reputation of the relay node is restored if
it was previously deteriorated unreasonably due to the accu-
mulation of incorrect detections provoked by radio transmis-
sion errors and packet collisions. With WM, the introduction
of the ‘suspicious’ category also contributes towards reduc-
ing the number of incorrect accusations. RFM achieves a
reduction in the number of incorrect accusations in Tables 3
and 4 by restoring the reputation of a relay node if a link fail-
ure is detected before the node is accused of acting selfishly.
Thus, the negative effects of link failures on the reputation
levels are alleviated with the RFM proposal.
Figure 6 represents the percentage of lost packets due to
the unavailability of safe routes as function of the percent-
age of selfish nodes. The results obtained when applying the
proposed techniques are compared to Marti’s (Fig. 6(a)) and
TEAM (Fig. 6(b)) protocols. The terms TEAM and Marti in
the figures (legend) correspond to the results obtained with
their original implementation. For clarity, only WM, RAM,
RFM and WRAM are included. The numbers included in the
figures indicate the difference in performance between our
best proposal and the original Marti’s and TEAM protocols.
It is important to note that increasing the number of avail-
able safe multi-hop routes results in a notable reduction of
the percentage of dropped packets due to the unavailability
of safe multi-hop routes.
The results reported in Tables 3 and 4 showed that the
proposed techniques reduce the number of correct route de-
nials, with the reductions being more significant for the tech-
niques using the warning mode, i.e. WM and WRAM. This
is due to the operation of the ‘suspicious’ category in the
warning mode that also reduced the number of correct ac-
cusations. Although this is not a desirable effect, Fig. 7
shows that overall it does not have a negative impact on the
PDR. Figure 7 represents the PDR obtained by the differ-
ent techniques proposed in this work when applied to Marti
and TEAM. The ability to accurately detect selfish and co-
operative relaying nodes with the techniques proposed in
this work leads to a notable increase of the PDR with re-
spect to the original SPP protocols. It can be appreciated
in Fig. 7 that this increase is maintained with slight varia-
tions when the percentage of active selfish nodes changes.
RAM achieves the greatest increment in PDR when applied
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Fig. 8 Percentage of packets dropped by selfish nodes for (a) Marti’s and (b) TEAM protocols
over Marti’s protocol. However, when applied over TEAM,
WRAM achieves a higher increment. The results depicted
in Fig. 7 show than the increase in PDR obtained with the
proposed techniques is in general higher when applied over
TEAM than over Marti’s protocol. However, the reduction
in the percentage of lost packets due to the unavailability of
safe routes (Fig. 6) is more important with Marti’s proto-
col than with TEAM. This apparent contradiction is due to
the fact that when combining the proposed techniques with
the Marti’s protocol there is a slight increase of lost pack-
ets due to link failures (this effect is discussed later). On
the other hand, when the proposed techniques are combined
with TEAM, a small reduction of lost packets due to link
failures is observed.
The PDR performance is not only influenced by the per-
centage of lost packets due the unavailability of routes, but
also by the percentage of packets dropped by selfish nodes
(see Fig. 8). This factor is influenced by a combination of
the reputation parameters shown in Tables 3 and 4. Reduc-
ing the number of incorrect route establishments, or increas-
ing the number of correct route establishments, will decrease
the percentage of packets dropped by selfish nodes. In addi-
tion, incrementing the number of correct accusations and the
number of correct route denials will also reduce the number
of packets dropped by selfish nodes. RAM is the only tech-
nique that reduces packets dropping in Fig. 8. As a result,
only the combinations including RAM (WRAM) achieve a
reduction or at least a minimum increase of the percentage
of packets dropped by selfish nodes. This is because RAM
is the only technique that reduces the number of incorrect
route establishments in Tables 3 and 4. The rest of tech-
niques, and in particular WM, increase the number of incor-
rect route establishments. When a node is accused of acting
selfishly, WM breaks the link and marks the node as ‘suspi-
cious’. Route requests coming from ‘suspicious’ nodes are
not rejected in order to rule out the possibility that the ac-
cusation was motivated by incorrect dropping detections.
Thus, the WM proposal increases the number of incorrect
route establishments, but also only slightly increases the per-
centage of packets dropped by selfish nodes (Fig. 8). This is
due to the fact that the duration of routes with selfish nodes
is short since ‘suspicious’ nodes are observed more tightly
than neutral nodes. Therefore, if a ‘suspicious’ node is act-
ing selfishly, one more dropping detection will be enough to
accuse it definitively of acting selfishly, which consequently
reduces the impact of increasing the number of incorrect
routes establishments in the percentage of packets dropped
by selfish nodes. The RFM proposal also increases slightly
the packets dropped by selfish nodes in Fig. 8 due to the
small increase in the number of incorrect routes established,
and the reduction in the number of correct route denials (see
Tables 3 and 4). This is motivated by the restoration of rep-
utation performed by RFM in case of link failure. On oc-
casion, the reputation of a selfish node may be restored be-
cause of a link failure if the node has not been accused yet of
acting selfishly. However, the increase in the percentage of
packets dropped by selfish nodes in the case of RFM is be-
low 3 % in Fig. 8. As a result, the majority of selfish nodes
are detected before a link failure is triggered. To decrease
the packets dropped by selfish nodes in RFM and WM, it
would be necessary to make the reputation protocols less
tolerant to packet dropping, e.g. reducing the timeout or re-
ducing the number of maximum faults, but this should be
made carefully as it could in turn increase the number of
incorrect accusations.
Another factor influencing the PDR performance in
Fig. 7 is the percentage of lost packets due to link failures,
which is illustrated in Fig. 9. The 802.11 MAC layer co-
ordinates the access to the shared radio channel among the
different mobile nodes through the Distributed Coordina-
tion Function (DCF) protocol. With radio-based networks,
a transmitting node cannot listen for collisions while send-
ing data, as it cannot sense the channel while transmitting a
frame. As a result, the receiving node needs to send an ACK
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Fig. 9 Percentage of packets dropped due to link failures for (a) Marti’s and (b) TEAM protocols
if no errors are detected in the received frame. If an ACK is
not received by the transmitting node after a specified period
of time, it will assume that collisions or radio propagation
errors may have prevented the correct transmission of the
packet, and will retransmit the frame. When the maximum
number of retransmissions established is reached, the MAC
of the transmitting node drops the packet, and reports a link
failure to the upper layers. The routing protocol breaks the
route and initiates a route discovery process if needed. Fig-
ure 9 shows that the percentage of lost packets due to link
failures is higher for Marti than for TEAM. Moreover, the
results in Fig. 9 show that when the proposed techniques
are applied to TEAM, the percentage of lost packets due
to link failures decreases compared to the original TEAM
implementation; on the other hand, the opposite applies to
Marti’s protocol. The conditions that route discovery pack-
ets received by a relaying node have to match in order to be
accepted and relayed are stricter for TEAM than for Marti’s
protocol (see Sect. 3). Marti’s protocol only rejects route dis-
covery packets when a selfish node is detected in the route.
On the other hand, when a node receives a route discovery
message to establish a new multi-hop route, TEAM evalu-
ates whether the average rating of the nodes participating in
the route is higher than the threshold-limit established. As
a result, a greater number of route requests are forwarded
with Marti’s protocol, which increases the number of RREQ
messages generated compared to TEAM. The routing over-
head generated by Marti’s protocol leads to an increased
utilization of the communications channel, and the loss of
MAC data frames as a result of packet collisions.
TEAM evaluates the ratio of every data packet that must
be forwarded by a relay node. If the packet rating is smaller
than the established rating threshold, the packet is discarded
due to its unsafe origin (see Sect. 3). As expected, the im-
portant reduction in the number of incorrect accusations, and
also in the number of correct accusations (see Table 4), leads
to an important reduction of the number of unsafe packets
Fig. 10 Percentage of packets dropped by the TEAM protocol due to
its unsafe origin
dropped by TEAM when the proposed techniques are also
applied (Fig. 10). This in turn explains the increase of the
PDR achieved with the proposed techniques when applied
to TEAM (Fig. 7).
Figures 11 and 12 show the effect of varying the percent-
age of radio transmission errors on the main performance
parameters. The figures compare the performance achieved
with the WM, RAM, RFM, and WRAM proposals when ap-
plied to the original Marti and TEAM protocols.2 The per-
centage of radio transmission errors has been modified by
changing the transmission power level (14 dBm, 17 dBm
and 20 dBm). Increasing the transmission power reduces
the percentage of radio transmission errors, and augments
the nodes’ communication range. As a result, the mean
number of hops per route decreases, and fewer packets are
dropped because no route could be established. This results
in a significant improvement of the PDR with the transmis-
sion power for all the techniques. Like in the default case
2The figures indicate the maximum improvement that can be obtained
by any of the proposed techniques, as well as the mean percentage of
radio transmission errors for each power level.
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Fig. 11 PDR as a function of transmission power: (a) Marti and (b) TEAM
Fig. 12 Percentage of dropped packets as a function of transmission power: (a) without route and (b) due to selfish nodes
(17 dBm transmission power), only the RAM technique is
able to reduce the number of packets dropped by selfish
nodes. However, all the techniques proposed improved the
PDR with respect to the original SPP protocol, with the
improvement being larger as the transmission power is re-
duced.
The effect of varying the percentage of packet collisions
has also been analyzed. To modify this percentage, the per-
centage of simultaneous active user sessions has been var-
ied from 15 % (default case) to 65 %. This was obtained
by reducing the mean interval between the start of sessions
as the total number of users remained unchanged. The ob-
tained results show that increasing the percentage of active
sessions (and as a result the rate of packet collisions) in-
creases the number of packets dropped without route (only
TEAM results are shown in Fig. 14(a) for brevity) and de-
creases the PDR (Fig. 13), especially when only the original
Marti or TEAM protocols are used. However, all the tech-
niques proposed (in particular WRAM and RAM) consider-
ably reduce the percentage of dropped packets with no route
compared to the original Marti and TEAM protocols; the
reduction increases with the packet collision rate. Increas-
ing the percentage of active user sessions reduces the num-
ber of packets dropped by selfish nodes (Fig. 14(b)). This
is because when nodes use more frequently the communica-
tions channel, they are more capable to learn the identity of
selfish nodes, and as a result the number of incorrect route
establishments decreases (and the number of correct route
denials increases). Figure 15(a) shows the number of route
establishments with selfish nodes (normalized by the per-
centage of active user sessions to make a fair comparison)
using the TEAM protocol and the proposed techniques. Fig-
ure 15(b) shows the number of correct route denials. The
obtained results show that the improvements obtained with
WRAM with respect to Marti and TEAM increase with the
percentage of active user sessions (Fig. 13). This is due to
the fact that as the percentage of active user sessions in-
creases, the number of packets dropped by selfish nodes de-
creases (Fig. 14(b)), and there is only a slight increase in the
number of packets dropped without route (Fig. 14(a)).
The results presented in this section have shown that the
proposed techniques manage to increase the availability of
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Fig. 13 PDR as a function of the percentage of active user sessions: (a) Marti and (b) TEAM
Fig. 14 Percentage of dropped packets as a function of the percentage of active user sessions: (a) without routes and (b) due to selfish nodes
Fig. 15 Number of (a) incorrect routes established and (b) correct route denials as a function of the percentage of active user sessions
safe multi-hop routes that may be used by the nodes to estab-
lish links with distant peers. This in turn results in a notice-
able decrease of the network latency, as shown in Table 5.
Table 5 shows the latency reduction achieved by the pro-
posed techniques with respect to original Marti’s and TEAM
protocols. The latency is measured as the time elapsed be-
tween the generation of a packet at the application layer in
the source node and the correct reception of the packet in
the destination node. The important increase of the avail-
ability of routes achieved with WM and its combinations
explains their higher latency reduction compared to RFM
and RAM.
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Table 5 Latency reduction compared to the original Marti’s and
TEAM protocols (%)
RFM WM RAM WRAFM WRAM
Marti 24.85 54.82 36.74 55.33 58.84
TEAM 23.62 43.86 24.46 52.95 43.84
7 Conclusions
Mobile ad-hoc nodes are expected to forward packets to ex-
tend the communications range through multi-hop transmis-
sions. However, selfish nodes may decide not to cooperate
to save their resources while still using the network to re-
lay their traffic. In this context, selfishness prevention proto-
cols are designed to encourage nodes to cooperate in net-
work functions, and prevent intentional attacks from ma-
licious nodes. Reputation-based SPP techniques are fully
distributed and can achieve good network performance, but
are very dependent on reliable mechanisms to detect selfish
nodes. Previous studies showed that traditional reputation-
based SPP protocols tend to overestimate the selfish behav-
ior of mobile nodes due to packet collisions and radio trans-
mission errors that can be mistaken with intentional packet
drops. To overcome these inefficiencies, this paper has pre-
sented and evaluated three techniques that improve the ca-
pability of SPP protocols to accurately detect real selfish
nodes, and increase the performance of cooperative mobile
ad-hoc networks. To evaluate their performance and appli-
cability to any reputation-based SPP, this study has imple-
mented the proposed techniques together with TEAM and
Marti’s protocols. The obtained results have demonstrated
the capacity of the proposed techniques to reduce the num-
ber of incorrect selfish accusations, and increase the avail-
ability of safe multi-hop routes, thereby improving the final
packet delivery ratio of mobile ad-hoc networks in presence
of selfish nodes.
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